cesses and, by so doing, to attain our goals, realize our ideals, satisfy our ambitions or other desires.

Causation seems to be of Two Kinds

The many biologists who are misled into acceptance, explicit or implicit, of this erroneous identification of causal with mechanical explanation overlook the fact that we all are familiar in some sense with causation of two leading types. If while two friends are climbing a rock-face together, a gust of wind dislodges a slab of rock and the rock falls upon one of them and hurls him down the precipice, his death is accidental, the causation of it mechanical. But if, of the two climbers, one, A, is secretly hostile to the other, B ; and if A has schemed and plotted successfully to lead B to the spot where 'the accident' occurs, and there, by a well-timed and well-directed thrust of his foot, has dislodged the rock which falls on B, and thus achieved his deliberately desired goal, the causation is very different. In the destruction of B, by means of this carefully planned course of action, no mar* not obfuscated by confused thinking on the problem of causation will refuse to recognize a form of causation very different from the accidental mechanical causation of the former instance. In the second case the destruction of B was not accidental; and, although the falling rock was a mechanical agent, it was the means used by A to achieve his purpose; its fall was initiated by and directed by A as the final step in a series of actions all directed towards the achievement of this foreseen and desired goal. *Prima facie* A's

foresight of the goal, his desire to achieve it, and his planning and execution of the step which led to its realization—all these mental activities would seem to have played an essential